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THE PEER REVIEW PROCESS IN
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION
Robert Robinson Gales*
I. INTRODUCTION
A topic that is becoming increasingly popular these days is
the Peer Review Process. This process, according to David Kronick
in his article entitled Peer Review in 18th Century Scientific Journal-
ism,' can be traced to the publication of Philosophical Transactions
by the Royal Society of London in 1752.2 Some agencies view the
process as a panacea for avoiding potentially troublesome agency de-
cisions. However, it can be a mechanism for enhancing the quality
and consistency of those decisions, of discouraging judicial innova-
tion, or even influencing or prescribing the outcome or the bottom
line of pending cases. Individual administrative adjudicators,
whether they are characterized as administrative judges, administra-
tive law judges, hearing examiners, hearing officers, magistrates, or
judges, view the process with considerable suspicion. To them, the
foremost purpose of this process - another pair of eyes armed with a
sharp red pencil, reviewing their work - is decisional interference de-
*Chief Administrative Judge, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals
(DOHA), Defense Legal Services Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
B.A., Ohio Wesleyan University; J.D., Syracuse University; LL.M., The
George Washington University; Graduate of the National Defense University.
This article is derived from a presentation made at the National Association
of Administrative Law Judges Annual Meeting and Conference in Albany,
New York, in October 2000. The views set forth herein are those of the au-
thor and do not purport to reflect the views or positions of the Department
of Defense or any other component of the federal government.
1. David Kronick, Peer Review in 18th Century Scientific Journalism, 263
JAMA 1321 (1990).
2. See Lars Noah, Sanctifying Scientific Peer Review: Publication as Proxy
for Regulatory Decisionmaking, 59 U. PnT. L. REv. 677 (Spring 1998) (criti-
cally analyzing the peer review process).
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signed to deprive them of the degree of decisional independence es-
sential for continued true due process.
Some administrative adjudicators contend that judicial inde-
pendence can only exist when the individual adjudicator's decision-
making process and the crafting of a decision is constrained solely by
their own reason, logic, knowledge of the law, literacy, and profes-
sional ethics and responsibility.
Ex parte input by the agency, also known as subsequent re-
view or approval, of the decision by the agency prior to issuance is
considered inappropriate control of the decision-making process pre-
senting a false pretense of due process. The administrative adjudica-
tor whose name or signature is affixed to the bottom of the decision,
should, in the words of Justice Vincent Brogna of Massachusetts,
"have the courage of your own error."3 The zealously independent
administrative adjudicator believes he or she should be free to be
wrong, biased, inconsistent, illogical, inarticulate, and incomplete.
Furthermore, these types of adjudicators believe that they should be
free to ignore facts, law, and policy.
To these adjudicators, errors or disagreements should be re-
solved during an open agency appellate review process, much as it is
with "real judges," and not through, what they see as, pre-issuance,
"quality control," decisional interference. After all, "[t]here can be
little doubt that the role of the modem... hearing examiner or ad-
ministrative law judge... is 'functionally comparable' to that of a
judge."4 Chief Administrative Law Judge Edwin Felter, Jr.5 sug-
gested that the process be taken beyond the appellate process and ar-
gued that there are other appropriate ways for agencies to deal with
undesired adjudication outcomes.6 He identified the undesired out-
comes as statutory or rule changes, and increased training of litiga-
tion and investigatory staff.7
3. Justice Vincent Brogna, Address to the American Academy of Judi-
cial Education, Cambridge, Mass. (July 9-14, 1978).
4. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
5. Director and Chief Administrative Law Judge, Colorado Division of
Administrative Hearings, Denver, Colo.
6. Edwin Felter, Jr., Maintaining the Balance Between Judicial Inde-
pendence and Judicial Accountability in Administrative Law, 17 J.NAALJ 89,
93 (Spring 1997).
7. Id.
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Chief Administrative Law Judge John Hardwicke,8 in his ex-
ceptional exchange with Administrative Law Judge Ronnie H.
Yoder,9 of the U.S. Department of Transportation addressed these is-
sues, adding that:
There's no question that [issues regarding the
correctness or bias of a judge] are for the re-
viewing appellate court. But it is awfully good
to try to get it right the first time, because the
appellate reviewing court gets into action only
at considerable expense and delay to the sys-
tem .... So it is entirely proper for a judge, a
reviewer charged with the duty of due process,
to take a look at the work of other judges ....
My experience has been that the judges who
do not like to be reviewed are the very judges
who must be reviewed.'0
The agency generally perceives such a degree of judicial in-
dependence "exercising the 'freedoms' and practicing self-constraint"
as encouraging a lack of adjudicator accountability or responsibility,
thereby creating "renegade" adjudicators who tend to "run amok," to
the potential detriment to the agency as well as the system."
SHOULD THE ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATOR BE FREE
TO BE WRONG, BIASED, INCONSISTENT, ILLOGICAL,
AND INARTICULATE? SHOULD THE ADMINISTRATIVE
ADJUDICATOR BE FREE TO IGNORE FACTS, LAW, AND
POLICY?
8. Chief Administrative Law Judge, Maryland Office of Administrative
Hearings.
9. Acting Chief Administrative Law Judge of the U.S. Department of
Transportation.
10. Ronnie A. Yoder & John Hardwicke, Yoder-Hardwicke Dialogue:
Does Mandatory Quality Assurance Oversight of AL]J Decisions Violate AJ]
Decisional Independence, Due Process or Ex Parte Prohibitions?, 17 J.NAALJ
75, 86 (Spring 1997).
11. Id. at 86.
While both sides offer some reasonable rationales for embrac-
ing or rejecting the process, in reality, the peer review process is not
entirely deleterious, depending on the specifics of the system selected
by the agency. Before the positions of the "combatants" become too
hardened, it appears appropriate to examine the process from a vari-
ety of perspectives, unburdened by parochial bias.
II. THE GENERIC PEER REVIEW PROCESS
Traditionally, a peer review process in some areas known, as
"refereeing" has been a method of:
1. Evaluating physicians' qualifications for staff
privileges at a hospital to ensure quality care of
patients.
2. Monitoring the quality of medical and nursing
services that patients receive.
3. Determining the merits of complaints concern-
ing the quality of medical or nursing services
furnished.
4. Evaluating teaching qualifications for univer-
sity faculty appointments and retention.
5. Assessing the quality, validity, and accuracy of
scientific arguments, procedures, and findings,
as well as the correctness and plausibility of
results for the allocation of resources, includ-
ing publication in scientific journals, research
funds, and recognition.
The internal monitoring and evaluation of other professional
activities and performance by members of individual professional
firms such as architects, engineers, and attorneys, has also com-
menced. 2 Until relatively recently, however, the formal process did
not extend to the decision-making of administrative adjudicators. It
is now rapidly achieving agency approbation.
12. See Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Them-
selves? An Empirical Study of Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHics 271 (Winter 1997) (analyzing attorney attitudes regarding peer
review).
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A. The "Peer"
1. Is the Reviewer Actually a Peer?
Before the peer review process can be meaningfully dis-
cussed, it is crucial to explore the individuals who might reasonably
constitute an appropriate "peer" matrix. A common definition of the
word "peer" is "a person ... of the same rank, value, quality, ability,
etc.; equal; specifically, an equal before the law."' 3 Another resource
defines "peer" as an "equal, match, fellow, like, equivalent, equipol-
lent, coequal, parallel, ditto [coll.]; peer, compeer, rival." 4 Finally, a
third adds "one that is very similar to another in rank or position:
doctors' competency reviewed by their peers. She is the peer of any
tennis player on the professional circuit," as well as the synonyms:
"coequal, colleague, compeer, equal, equivalent, fellow" to the defi-
nitions of the word "peer."15
Thus, it appears that the "peer" selected to "peer review" de-
cisions of administrative adjudicators should be of the same or equal
background, grade, position, or responsibility as the deciding admin-
istrative adjudicator; in other words, a colleague. This raises several
fundamental questions as to the propriety of appointing individuals
serving in the following positions as a peer reviewer: a supervising,
presiding, or chief judge; an agency director of policy; an agency
staff attorney; any agency supervisor; any member in an agency Sub-
ject Matter Specialist division; a clerical, administrative, or staff per-
son within the agency judiciary division; a judicial colleague in an
agency Subject Matter Specialist division; or a judicial colleague in
the agency judiciary division.
2. Goals of Peer Relationships.
"The goal of peer relationships is cooperation among
equals." 6 The person selected to perform "peer review" responsibili-
ties must be free of any agenda or bias. Furthermore, for the process
13. WEBSTER'S NEw WORLD DIcIoNARY 996 (3d ed. 1988).
14. ROGEr'S INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS 13 (3d ed. 1962).
15. ROGET'S II: THE NEW THESAURUS 719 (1988).
16. SANDRA BuRT & LINDA PERLIS, PARENTS AS MENTORS 175 (Prima Pub-
lishing 1999).
to achieve maximum effectiveness, and to improve the overall quality
of the decision, the peer reviewer must provide fair, balanced, and
constructive criticism and comment. To do otherwise may prove to
be counterproductive.
III. THE PEER REvIEw PROCESS
For the purposes of this discussion, I have chosen to divide
the peer review process into segments identified as Pre-Issuance Re-
view and Post-Issuance Review, terms which will be further ex-
plained below.
The Pre-Issuance Review possesses the potential of interfer-
ing with decisional independence, especially if it focuses on the "bot-
tom line." Decisional consistency within the agency essentially
serves as a quality critique and refinement of those components of the
decision which precede the "bottom line." It is a quality enhancer.
Unfortunately, it is also an impediment to timeliness. Pre-Issuance
Review is the focus of this article.
The Post-Issuance Review takes place after the decision has
been issued. It suffers from few of the negative characteristics of the
Pre-Issuance Review, and serves primarily as an educational tool for
future improvement of fact-finding, legal research, interpretation, le-
gal drafting, and analysis. It can also be used as a method of gauging
professional performance. Post-Issuance Review will not be dis-
cussed any further in this article.
GALES' COMPONENTS OF PRE-ISSUANCE REVIEW:
Clerical Review
Quality Review
Agency Compliance Review
Agency Acceptability Review
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GALES' COMPONENTS OF POST-ISSUANCE REVIEW:
Agency Decision Consistency Analysis
Agency Education and Training Review
A. Pre-Issuance Review - The Clerical Review
The initial step in the process, and the one which creates the
least angst or opposition among administrative adjudicators, is what I
have styled the Clerical Review. If decision drafters will concede
that the self-proofreading review is difficult because the eye sees
what it believes is written on the page rather than what is actually on
the page, opposition to having a second pair of eyes generally dimin-
ishes. Someone other than a true "peer" may perform this form of
review, the typist, clerk, or administrative assistant who reports to the
decision-making administrative adjudicator. Alternatively, the func-
tion may be performed by a colleague, the true peer.
The Clerical Review consists of the rudimentary form of re-
view, and is usually limited to the most noticeable imperfections
without the peer possessing cognizance of the facts or issues of the
particular case. In other words, only the decision is examined, and
review of the case file is unnecessary. The use by the administrative
adjudicator of generally accepted standards of grammar, syntax,
punctuation, and spelling is significant, and a peer's knowledge and
ability in these areas, as well as in proofreading, are beneficial.
Among the most widely read and respected writers, teachers,
and commentators in this area are William Strunk, Jr. and E.B.
White,"r Joseph M. Williams, 8 and Richard C. Wydick."9 Other sig-
17. WILLIAM STRUNK, JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE (3d ed.,
MacMillan 1979).
18. JOSEPH M. WILLIAMS, STYLE: TEN LESSONS IN CLARITY AND GRACE (4th
ed., HarperCollins College Publishers 1994).
19. RICHARD C. WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS (4th ed., Carolina
Academic Press 1998).
nificant contributors are Paul A. Bateman and Michael H. Frost,
20
Elizabeth A. Francis,21 and Timothy P. Terrell.22 Their individual
views and presentations, whether in person or in writing, while not
identical, do offer a degree of similarity, and are highly valued and
recommended to anyone who is unfamiliar with them. A brief com-
ment regarding the basics of grammar, syntax, punctuation, and spell-
ing, is inevitable if this concept is to be sufficiently analyzed.
"The Uudge] confronted with the task of writing a
legal document would do well to remember what
may be called the ABC of legal writing. These let-
ters represent three indispensable requirements of
brief writing in particular and legal writing in gen-
eral "Accuracy, Brevity, and Clarity."'
Joseph Williams, in his Style: Ten Lessons in Clarity and
Grace, stressed the significance of six areas of focus in writing: (1)
Clarity; (2) Concision; (3) Cohesion (a sense of flow from old to
new); (4) Coherence (a sense of focus); (5) Punctuation; and (6)
Spelling.24 He observed the three (or was it four) rules of correct
grammar. Referring to what he called "Real Rules" - the first group
of his rules - he stated: "When we violate these rules, (the Rules of
Standard Usage) our educated readers notice and condemn." 25 He
theorized that, "the most important rules include those whose viola-
tion unequivocally brand you as a writer of nonstandard English.
26
20. Professors of Law, Southwestern University School of Law; visiting
faculty member at The National Judicial College.
21. Professor, University of Nevada at Reno; visiting faculty member
with The National Judicial College.
22. Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law, co-authored
STEPHEN V. ARMSTRONG & TIMOTHY P. TERRELL, THINKING LIKE A WRITER: A LAW-
YER'S GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE WRITING AND EDITING (1992).
23. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 187 (1990) (citing EDWARD DOMENIC RE,
BRIEF WRITING AND ORAL ARGUMENT (6th ed., West Publishing Co. 1983)).
24. WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 19.
25. Id. at 18.
26. Id. at 19.
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JOSEPH WILLIAMS' REAL RULES:
Double negatives: The car had hardly no systematic care.
Nonstandard verbs: They knowed what would happen.
Double comparatives: This way is more quicker.
Some ADJECTIVES for ADVERBS: They worked real good.
Some incorrect pronouns: Him and me will study it.
Some subject-verb disagreements: We was ready to begin.27
Referring to what he called "Folklore" - the second group of
his rules - Joseph Williams maintained that when we violate these
"rules," few, if any, educated readers notice, much less condemn. So
these are not rules at all, but folklore, enforced by many editors and
schoolteachers, but ignored by most educated and careful writers;
"that we can ignore, unless those we are writing for have the power to
exact from us whatever kind of writing they like."28
JOSEPH WILLIAMS' FOLKLORE:
Never begin a sentence with and, but, or because.
Use the RELATIVE PRONOUN that, not which, for restrictive
clauses: use which for NON-RESTRICTIVE CLAUSES.
Use fewer with nouns that you can count, less with quantities
you cannot.
Use of since and while.
Disinterested versus uninterested.9
Referring to what he called "Optional Rules" - the third
group of his rules - Joseph Williams stated: "These rules complement
the Real Rules: Few readers notice when you violate these Optional
Rules, but most readers will notice when you observe them and as-
sume that you are signaling special formality. 3 °
27. Id.
28. Id. at 18-19.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 24.
JOSEPH WILLIAMS' OPTIONAL RULES:
Do not split infinitives.
Use shall as the first person simple future, will for second and
third person future; use will to mean strong intention in the first
person, shall for second and third person.
Use whom as the object of a verb or preposition.
Do not end a sentence with a preposition."
Referring to what he called "The Btes Noires" - the fourth
group of his rules - Joseph Williams asserted: "These are the items
the columnists and commentators endlessly cite as evidence that cul-
tivated English is an endangered species .... [T]hey have become
the symbolic flags around which those most concerned with linguistic
purity have apparently agreed to rally. None of these 'errors' inter-
feres with clarity and concision ... 
JOSEPH WILLIAMS' BtTES NOIRES:
Never use like for as or as if.
After different use from, never to or than.
Never use irregardless for regardless.
Do not modify an absolute word such as perfect, unique, final,
or complete with very, more, quite, and so on.33
Joseph Williams also described the art of concision, or suc-
cinctness, by referring to his "Five Principles of Economy" in prun-
ing wordiness.' Those principles are: (1) Delete words that mean lit-
tle or nothing: very and all; (2) Delete words that repeat other words:
every in each and every; (3) Delete words whose meaning your
reader can infer from other words: that someone offers us is from
suggestion; (4) Replace a phrase with a word: listen to and think over
to consider; (5) Change unnecessary negatives to affirmatives.35
31. Id.
32. Id. at 27.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 89.
35. Id.
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36. Id.
37. Id.
JOSEPH WILLIAMS' 1ST PRINCIPLE OF
ECONOMY:
Delete Meaningless Words
kind of
actually
particular
individual36
JOSEPH WILLIAMS' 2ND PRINCIPLE OF
ECONOMY:
Delete Doubled Words
full and complete
any and all
each and every
first and foremost
various and sundry37
Surlnt 201 Pe eiwI diitaieAjdcto
JOSEPH WILLIAMS' 3RD PRINCIPLE OF
ECONOMY:
Delete What Readers Infer:
Redundant Modifiers
basic fundamentals
future plans
personal beliefs
final outcome
end result
true facts
important essentials
past history
eventual outcome
Delete What Readers Infer:
Redundant Categories
period of time
membrane area
pink in color
shiny in appearance
large in size
unusual in nature
in a corhfused state38
38. Id.
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JOSEPH WILLIAMS' 4TH PRINCIPLE OF
ECONOMY:
Replace a Phrase With a Word
the reason for
for the reason that
due to the fact that
owing to the fact that
in light of the fact that
considering the fact that
on the grounds that
(use because, since, why)
despite the fact that
regardless of the fact that
notwithstanding the fact that
(use although, even though)
it is possible that
there is a chance that
it could happen that
the possibility exists for
(use may, might, can, could)3 9
39. Id.
S•r[U 20 PerRveInAmnsrteAdicaio
Richard Wydick, in his Plain English for Lawyers, stressed
the significance of word selection and arrangement, as well as punc-
tuation, as his focus in writing.4' He also observed:
The moral is this: do not be too impressed by
the Latin and archaic English words [lawyer-
isms such as aforementioned, whereas, res
gestae, and hereinafter] you read in law books.
Their antiquity does not make them superior.
When your pen is poised to write a lawyerism,
stop to see if your meaning can be expressed
as well or better in a word or two of ordinary
English.42
He emphasized the importance of being precise and consistent
in using words of authority such as must, shall, will, may, should, and
their negative forms, such as must not, and will not.43 The term shall
causes the most difficulties, with United States drafting authorities
slowly coming around from the previous interpretation that it im-
poses a duty to do something, to the United Kingdom view that the
term is simply too unreliable to use for any purpose.'
40. Id.
41. WYDICK, supra note 19, at 63.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 66-67.
44. Id. at 67.
JOSEPH WILLIAMS' 5TH PRINCIPLE OF
ECONOMY:
Change Negatives to Affirmatives
not different versus similar
not many versus few
not consider versus ignore
not have versus lack
not the same versus different
not accept versus reject 4°
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RICHARD WYDICK'S CAUTION TO USE WORDS
OF AUTHORITY WITH CARE:
must = is required to
must not = is required not to; is disallowed
may = has discretion to; is permitted to
may not = is not permitted to; is disallowed from
is entitled to = has a right to
should = ought to
will = an expression of obligations
shall = ?"
RICHARD WYDICK'S CAUTION TO AVOID SEXIST
LANGUAGE:
Don't use expressions that imply value judgments based on sex:
a manly effort, or a member of the gentle sex
Use sex-neutral terms if you can do so without artificiality:
workers versus workmen, reasonable person versus reason-
able man. But don't concoct artificial terms like waitpersons.
Use parallel construction when you are referring to both sexes:
husbands and wives, not men and their wives
Don't use a sex-based pronoun when the referent may not be of
that sex: he every time you refer to a party or witness46
Richard Wydick also discussed the significance of punctua-
tion, and attorneys' traditional distrust of it. " The distrust arose
from a variety of sources such as:
* [A] secretary having a monetary lapse of concentra-
tion;
* [A] fly leaving a deposit that could pass as a comma;
* [S]ome writers' punctuation for rhythmic and elocu-
tionary effect, and;
* [S]ome writers' syntactical punctuation48
He cautioned writers to punctuate carefully, and related the
stories of cases in which the decisions had turned on punctuation:
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 86.
48. Id.
Sin 200 PeReewIAdistaiveAjdcto
[I]n United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, the
United States Supreme Court split 5-4 over
the significance of a comma in a bankruptcy
statute. One lower federal court had called it
a "capricious" comma, and another had called
it an awfully "small hook on which to hang a
[substantial] change in the law." The majority
of five Supreme Court Justices, with no apol-
ogy, relied partly on the comma to conclude
that the statute was clear on its face. The four
dissenting Justices, on the other hand, tried
to obliterate the comma with a blast of slogans
from old cases: punctuation is minor and not
controlling, punctuation is not decisive, punc-
tuation is the most fallible standard by which
to interpret a writing, and punctuation can be
changed or ignored to effectuate congressional
intent.49
Workshops routinely offer punctuation as a pivotal agenda
theme, that is:
" [T]he six most frequently missed rules for us-
ing commas
* [H]ow to use semicolons to improve the
"flow" of your sentences
* [H]ow and when to use colons
* [W]hen you should use quotation marks, and
when you shouldn't (By the way, does the pe-
riod go inside or outside the quotation marks?)
* [W]here to place apostrophes in words ending
in s "
* [D]ashes and parentheses (Did you know they
are opposites?)
Proofreading is another crucial topic which demands atten-
tion to detail. The significance of the process is that the proofreader
cannot merely "survey" writings by section or area, but must instead
have an ability to check each individual keystroke along with the
overall sentence. Another workshop provides basics of proofreading
that includes in it's agenda: (1) How to increase your proofreading
49. Id. at 87 (citations omitted).
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speed, without sacrificing accuracy; (2) Are you an editor or a proof-
reader? How to determine which skill your job really requires; (3)
Spotting common typographical errors; (4) How to correct writing
without changing the meaning; (5) Tricks for finding duplicate words
and omitted letters; (6) Overcoming monotony and staying alert when
proofreading; (7) Creating distance from your work so you can catch
your own errors; (8) Proofreading with a partner to increase your ac-
curacy; and (9) An ingenious way to proofread numbers.
"The key to good writing is rewriting.""°
Judge Ruggero Aldisert, formerly Chief Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in his book Opinion
Writing, stressed the significance of rewriting:
If you will reread your early drafts for style,
you will find intensifying adverbs that you put
there to add force but which you now see
merely sound like bluffing or exaggeration.
You will find nouns qualified by one or more
adjectives; if you think, or consult a thesau-
rus, you will be able to find a single noun that
will do the job by itself, and do it more pun-
gently. You will find loose, unharnessed sen-
tences that you can rearrange and tighten.
When you think you have a passable draft,
read it aloud. Or have a friend, perhaps your
[spouse], read it to you. As you listen, you will
hear passages that sound flat or awkward. If
the reader's voice falters, if he stresses the
wrong word, if the rhythm breaks, the passage
needs reworking. Perhaps it needs to be
thrown away, in favor of a fresh start.
Finally, with much labor and perhaps a little
luck, you succeed in wiping out all evidence of
the sweat and toil that went into it. You have
a paragraph that sounds easy and natural.
For that is the aim of all the labor, to make it
sound unlabored. "A picture is finished," said
50. ALDISERT, supra note 23, at 262.
Sprin 201 Pe eiwI diitaieAjdcto
the painter Whistler, "when all trace of the
means used to bring about the end has disap-
peared."
If you succeed, you will have the gratifying
feeling as you reread your work that the words
you have used and your arrangement of them
hit just the right note to produce the effect you
want. Phrases, sentences, whole paragraphs,
ring pleasingly in your mind and your ear.
"This is good!" you will say, a little surprised
and more than a little pleased. That is your
reward, the sense of satisfaction with a job
well done that is the ultimate reward of any
craftsman.5"
51. Id.
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28 MATTERS THAT WRITERS OUGHT TO BE APPRAISED OF:
(1) Subjects and verb always has to agree.
(2) Make each pronoun agree with their antecedent.
(3) Just between you and I, case is important too.
(4) Being bad grammar, the writer will not use dangling participles.
(a) "Finding no error, the judgment below is affirmed."
(5) Parallel construction with coordinate conjunctions is not only an aid to clar-
ity but also the mark of a good writer.
(6) Join clauses good, like a conjunction should
(7) Don't write run-on sentences they are hard to read, you should punctuate.
(8) Don't use no double negatives. Not never.
(9) Mixed metaphors are a pain in the neck and ought to be thrown out the win-
dow.
(10) A truly good writer is always especially careful to practically eliminate the
too-frequent use of adverbs.
(11 )In my opinion, I think that an author when he is writing somthing should
not get accustomed to the habit of making use of too many redundant unneces-
sary words that he does not actually really need in order to put his message
across to the reader of what he has written.
(12) About them sentence fragments. Sometimes all right.
(13) Try to not ever split infinitives.
(14) Its important to use your apostrophe's correctly.
(15) Do not use a foreign term when there is an adequate English quid pro quo.
(16) If you must use a foreign term, it is de rigor to use it correctly.
(17) It behooves the writer to avoid archaic expressions.
(18) Do not use hyperbole; not one writer in a million can use it effectively.
(19) But, don't use commas, which are not necessary.
(20) Placing a comma between subject and predicate, is not correct.
(21) Parenthetical words however should be enclosed in commas.
(22) Use a comma before nonrestrictive clauses which are a common source of
difficulty.
(23) About repetition, the repetition of a word is not usually an effective kind
of repetition.
(24) Concult the dictionary frequently to avoid mispeling. Corect speling is
esential.
(25) In scholarly writing, don't use contractions.
(26) Don't abbrev. unless nec.
(27) Proofread your writing to see if you any words out.
(28) Last but not least, knock off the clichds. Avoid clichds like the plague.52
52. Id. at 187 (citing ROBERT A. LEFLAR, APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINION 195-
96 (1974)).
On a personal note, I might have avoided embarrassment
caused by one of my own decisions if I had exercised the opportunity
to have a second pair of eyes peer review it prior to issuance. In ex-
plaining the milieu in which a party had descended during a lengthy
period of illegal substance abuse, I stated, rather succinctly: "He suc-
cumbed to pear [sic] pressure."53 A good peer reviewer would catch
such an error.
The administrative adjudicator is generally aware of the sig-
nificance of the appearance of the written decision and the positive
impact resulting from an effective Clerical Review. Errors in gram-
mar, syntax, punctuation, and spelling can be routinely discovered
and corrected before the decision is issued to the public, thereby
avoiding potential embarrassment to the administrative adjudicator.
Nevertheless, despite the positive features of the Clerical Review,
there remains an intractable minority, perhaps between two and five
percent of those polled in a largely unscientific survey of adjudicators
who strongly oppose any form of peer review, including this rudi-
mentary form of review. The issue is not quality or practicality, but
rather the highly charged "judicial independence."
B. Pre-Issuance Review - The Quality Review
The second step in the process, and one which generates a
moderate degree of angst or opposition among administrative adjudi-
cators, is what I have styled the Quality Review. This form of review
should be performed by a true "peer," a colleague, because it requires
a magnitude of expertise and experience greater than that ordinarily
possessed by the clerical reviewer.
Quality Review scrutinizes the legal accuracy and thorough-
ness as well as the logic of the document. To accomplish this, total
immersion in the case file is needed to enable the peer reviewer to
become intimately familiar with the facts, the issues presented, the
applicable law and policy, the motions, the evidentiary rulings, and
the conclusions. In other words, a de novo review occurs with the
peer stepping into the thought processes of the administrative adjudi-
cator and, at least on some points, substituting the peer's judgment
for that of the administrative adjudicator. Regrettably, it is the same
type of undertaking that adjudicators loathe when appellate bodies
53. See DISCR OSD, No. 89-0790, at 9 (Feb. 28, 1990).
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endeavor to substitute their judgment for that of the trial judge. At
this level of review, grammar, syntax, punctuation, and spelling be-
come secondary to legal analysis, accuracy, thoroughness, logic, and
a "peer' s" knowledge and ability in these areas.
"We hold these truths to be self-evident that all trial judges are
created equal, that they are endowed by their office with certain
unalienable rights, that among these rights are the right and the
duty to make and issue decisions without mandatory preissuance
review by anyone. '
"Judges may find that a good way to ensure clarity and sound
reasoning is to have an able colleague review, edit, and criticize
the decision.""5
The above remarks provide the discordant positions regarding
the appreciation of the Peer Review Process in administrative adjudi-
cation. While the former sentiment stresses the "rights" of the adju-
dicator, to the apparent exclusion of other considerations, the latter
emphasizes the benefits to the adjudicator and the system. Due proc-
ess, while presumably a cornerstone to the entire system, is not even
specifically mentioned in the controversy. An examination of the
components of the Quality Review should afford greater insight into
the issue.
Dean Patrick Hugg"6 stressed the significance of editing and
critiquing in his article entitled Professional Writing Methodology. 7
He opined that the "editing and critiquing of the legal writing and
analysis of others are two of the most powerful teaching tools avail-
able to supervisors." 8 He also wrote that because editing and critiqu-
ing are difficult supervisory functions, they should be approached
54. Yoder & Hardwicke, supra note 10, at 75 (Justice Yoder was re-
sponding to the issue of mandatory quality assurance oversight and its po-
tential conflicts with an Administrative Law Judge.).
55. MORRELL MULLENS, MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 123 (3d
ed. 1993).
56. Dean of Loyola Law School, New Orleans, La.
57. Patrick R. Hugg, Professional Writing Methodology, 14 J.NAALJ 165,
165 (Fall 1994).
58. Id. at 238.
with care.59 He observed that constructively critiquing and editing
the work of others is challenging and should not be rushed.' °
DEAN HUGG'S EDITING AND CRITIQUING ANALYTICAL
FEATURES:
Clarity
Coherence
Correct Law
Full Facts
Sound and Explicit Reasoning
Conclusion 6'
He suggested reading the entire decision twice, first looking for
"thoughtful analysis and expression," and not the easier-to-correct er-
rors of style and form, and then looking for overall organization.62
He recommended that reactions be noted, clearly and readable, with-
out cryptic
remarks or vague symbols in the margins, to facilitate acceptance and
minimize resentment.' Additionally, he cautioned against focusing
on minutiae or form errors, and exhorted concentration on thorough-
ness and sound reasoning.64
Another important step in the editing and critiquing process
was identified as the identification, characterization (which he
called "statement"), and analysis of the issue.6"
59. Id.
60. Id. at 239.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 240.
65. Id. at 241.
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DEAN HUGG'S EDITING AND CRITIQUING "ISSUE"
IDENTIFICATION CHECKLIST:
Issue clearly identified
Issue not clearly identified
Issue missed66
DEAN HUGG'S EDITING AND CRITIQUING "ISSUE"
CHARACTERIZATION CHECKLIST:
Incorporates (fails to incorporate) relevant facts and law
(Not) Concise
Too broad67
66. Id.
67. Id.
DEAN HUGG'S EDITING AND CRITIQUING
ISSUE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST:
General Responsiveness
Does (not) respond to identified issue
Is (not) well reasoned and logical
Is thorough and well focused
Is superficial
Is conclusory
Use of Authority
Precedent rules & holdings (not) adequately defined/explained
Relationship of precedent case to analysis (not) supported with
facts/holding/reasoning of cited case
Authority does not support analysis
Extraneous facts from case obscure analysis
Quotations used appropriately
Quotations: too many, too long, not integrated into analysis
Conclusion
Conclusions (not) adequately summarized'
Judge Ruggero Aldisert, in his book Opinion Writing, also
underscored the magnitude of issue analysis, and stressed five differ-
ent areas of inquiry for appellate consideration, areas which are also
applicable at the trial level. 9
68. Id.
69. See ALDISERT, supra note 23, at 270.
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JUDGE ALDISERT'S ANALYSIS OF ISSUES THE RATIO
DECIDENDICA SYSTEMATIC DISCUSSION OF THE IS-
SUES POSED:
1. Identify the flash point of the controversy and discuss only
what is essential for a resolution.
a. If the law and its application alike are plain, your
opinion should be short and to the point.
b. If the law is certain and the application alone is
doubtful, be sure you have explained how the law
applies to the facts. Be just as sure you did not
waste the reader's time justifying your choice of
law.
c. If neither the rule nor, afortiori, its application is
clear, discuss:
i. (1)Choice, interpretation, and application of
the legal precept, or
ii. (2)Interpretation and application of the legal
precept.
2. Is the discussion of the issue overwritten? Have you bela-
bored the point or stated the obvious?
3. Have you discussed the critical issues presented? Have important conten-
tions been discussed or swept under the rug?
4. Is the logical development sound?
a. Is the choice of a major premise supported by the applica-
ble law and facts of the case?
b. Have you followed the rules of inductive and deductive
logic?
c.Is the opinion free of formal or material fallacies?
5. What is the "gobbledygook" or "Jabberwocky" factor?7"
After lamenting that the "promiscuous uttering of citations
has replaced the crisply stated, clean lines of legal reasoning,"71
Judge Aldisert emphasized the proper use of citations and authori-
ties.72
70. Id.
71. Id. at 105.
72. Id. at 227-28.
JUDGE ALDISERT'S RECOMMENDED USE OF CITATIONS
AND AUTHORITIES:
(1) If it is at all possible to do so, you should confine citations to
your jurisdiction. It makes no sense to refer to another court's deci-
sion if your own court has decided the point.
(2) You should require your law clerks to check meticulously:
1. To be certain that the law cited in the opinion is current
and in the appropriate citation format.
2.Every quotation, word for word, punctuation mark for
punctuation mark.
3.Each word and symbol for consistency in style. You
should not use "percent" on one page and "%" on the next.
4.Typographical errors and misspellings. Those who cannot
spell should consult those who can. If there are none such in
your court, it might be well to invest in spell-checking soft-
ware.
(3) You should avoid string citations. A single citation, one that
demonstrates similar or identical facts, may give you your most ef-
fective argument. String citations may be justified, however, in lim-
ited circumstances. Some judges use them effectively when a chal-
lenge has been lodged against a legal precept that in fact is settled
law in the jurisdiction. Sometimes, you may make your point suc-
cinctly by citing a leading case and adding "(collecting cases)."
(4) You should never exaggerate the holding of a citation, never....
(5) You should avoid stating the citation in terms of a broad princi-
ple. A tight, fact-specific rule of law will serve you better.
(6) Where there is primary reliance upon only one precedent, you
should summarize the holding, the reasoning and the facts.73
Dean Hugg underscored the proper use of authorities in a slightly dif-
ferent manner.74
73. Id.
74. Hugg, supra note 57, at 241.
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DEAN HUGG'S EDITING AND CRITIQUING
USE OF AUTHORITY CHECKLIST:
Precedent rules & holdings (not) adequately defined/explained
Relationship of precedent case to analysis (not) supported with
facts/holding/reasoning of cited case
Authority does not support analysis
Extraneous facts from case obscure analysis
Quotations used appropriately
Quotations: too many, too long, not integrated into analysis75
1. May Judges Ethically and Professionally Confer With
Other Judges Regarding Pending Matters, and if so, Should
Such Conferring Take Place?
Throughout the discussion of the Pre-Issuance Review, "The
Quality Review" component, I have stressed matters of quality, with-
out any reference to the outcome or the "bottom line" of pending
cases. Administrative Law Judge Edward Schoenbaum76 urged in his
article, Managing Your Docket Effectively and Efficiently, that before
arriving at the "bottom line," especially in complex cases, it would
profit the administrative adjudicator to confer with a colleague in or-
der to consider alternative viewpoints and determine if the "draft" de-
cision is "rational, understandable, and concise."77
Administrative Law Judge Ann Marshall Young, also articu-
lated this theme 8 in her presentation, Writing and Editing to Make
Your Rationale More Rational, at the 1997 AnnualMeeting and Con-
75. Id.
76. Administrative Law Judge with the Illinois Department of Employ-
ment Security - Tax Unit, in Springfield, Ill.
77. Edward J. Schoenbaum, Managing Your Docket Effectively and Effi-
ciently, 19 J.NAALJ 37, 51 (Spring 1999).
78. Formerly, Administrative Law Judge with the Tennessee Depart-
ment of State, Administrative Procedures Division, in Nashville, Tenn.
S-rind 2001 P
ference of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges, in
Denver, Colorado:
Seek and use feedback from colleagues wisely,
consider it with an open mind, and don't dis-
count any suggestion out of hand. Discuss ar-
eas of perceived lack of clarity, to assist you in
making your decision more understandable.
Remember, however, that in the end your
name goes on the decision, and you must ul-
timately be the judge of what the final product
will be, and of whether you have done all you
can reasonably do to assure that your writing
meets the tests of precision, efficiency, memo-
rability, persuasiveness, clarity, and coher-
ence, in short, whether it makes sense.
Judges, like lawyers, will disagree at times, in matters
of substance and matters of style, and the final editor
of your decisions is you. °
Furthermore, The Judge's Book advocated the use of "plain
words, simple sentences, and short paragraphs. Read it over, hunting
for confusing phrases and inaccurate language. Better yet, read it to
somebody else, a colleague, a law clerk, or a secretary. A little time
and effort now can save major embarrassment later."'"
Judge Patricia Wald,82 in her article entitled Some Thoughts
on Beginnings and Ends: Court of Appeals Review of Administrative
Law Judges' Findings and Opinions,83 stressed the importance of
eliminating confusion or inconsistencies in drafting decisions:
ALJs thus need to lay out for us not only the
critical findings, but the basis on which they
79. Ann Marshall Young, Writing and Editing to Make Your Rationale
More Rational, Presentation at the 1997 Annual Meeting and Conference of
the National Association of Administrative Law Judges (manuscript at 10)
(1997).
80. Id.
81. Alfred Di Bona, Jr., THE JUDGE'S BOOK 227 (Nat'l Conference of State
Trial Judges of Judicial Admin. Div. Am. Bar Ass'n Nat'l Judicial Coll. and
Nat'l Judicial Coil. eds., 2d ed. 1994).
82. Formerly Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals, District
of Columbia Circuit.
83. Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Beginnings and Ends: Court of
Appeals Review of Administrative Law Judges' Findings and Opinions, 67
WASH. U. L.Q. 661, 668-69 (1989).
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have made them, even spoon-feeding us the
record cites for the most important findings.
You need to distinguish between the primary
findings based on witnesses or documents and
the secondary inferences you draw from those
sources. You need to draw us a map of how
both your primary and secondary findings
lead you to your conclusions of law, and what
legal standards you are applying to the
facts.... I know that with article III judges,
one's colleagues often succeed in picking up
inconsistencies and gaps in one's reasoning or
clarity that may produce confusion if left un-
corrected. Many remands could be avoided by
some comparable internal review process at all
stages of agency decisionmaking. s4
Many administrative adjudicators are assisted in the drafting
of decisions by a coterie of legal support staff including decision
writers, law clerks, attorneys, paralegals, secretaries, and administra-
tive assistants. Those benefiting from such support have the luxury
of the self-contained peer review team. Others, however, perhaps
constituting the majority of administrative adjudicators, may have no
such staff. When one individual must conduct the hearing, as well as
draft and type the decision, informally conferring with a colleague or
formally undergoing a peer review may be the only alternative avail-
able to assure good quality.
Some of those administrative adjudicators who are most zeal-
ous in their opposition to any form of peer review are the very ones
benefiting from support staff. For example, during the preparation of
his article, Professor Russell L. Weaver discovered that the Social
Security Administration had 850 administrative law judges, 650 staff
attorneys, and 275 paralegal specialists; with the 925 staff attorneys
and paralegal specialists serving primarily as decision writers, prepar-
ing initial drafts of decisions, and performing legal research.85 The
Department of Transportation had four attorney-advisors supporting
84. Id.
85. Russell L. Weaver, AL] Support Systems: Staff Attorneys and Deci-
sion Writers, 16 J.NAALJ 89, 90-91 (Spring 1996).
the administrative law judges by conducting research and drafting
decisions.86
These commentaries endorse conferring with colleagues, law
clerks, and staff assistants; a teamwork approach that stresses the
goal of achievement of quality through reviewing, analyzing, reason-
ing, exchanging ideas, identifying alternatives, and strategizing.
Though the "bottom line" is not specifically addressed, Judge Aldis-
ert pointed out:
Obviously, choosing the most literate law clerk
is not enough. It is the judge who makes de-
cisions and then must explain them. It is the
judge who holds the commission. It is the
judge whose name goes on the opinion. It is
the judge who must assume 100 percent of
the responsibility. The law clerk is an assis-
tant, and only an assistant. The law clerk
must help in research, in the drafting process
and in expressing views of the law, but, and
this is a big "but," every sentence the law clerk
writes in the opinion must be totally under-
stood and endorsed by the opinion-writing
judge. To delegate some writing responsibili-
ties to a law clerk is more than proper; it is an
absolute necessity in this litigious age. This
delegation, however, is legitimate only to the
extent that the judge accepts the submitted
language, understands what has been written,
agrees with it and is willing to stake a profes-
sional reputation on it. 87
One of the explosive issues stressed by opponents of collegial
conferring prior to the issuance of decisions is that of ex parte com-
munications and the relevance of the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct and the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct for State
Administrative Law Judges. Canon 3 of the ABA Model Code of Ju-
dicial Conduct states, in part:
A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider
ex parte communications, or consider other
communications made to the judge outside
86. Id. at 92.
87. ALDISERT, supra note 23, at 8-9.
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the presence of the parties concerning a pend-
ing or impending proceeding except that: ...
(c) A judge may consult with court personnel
whose function is to aid the judge in carrying
out the judge's adjudicative responsibilities or
with other judges.
The Commentary to Canon 3(A)(4) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct for State Administrative Law Judges states, in part: "The
proscription against [ex parte] communications concerning a pro-
ceeding includes communications from lawyers, law teachers, and
other persons who are not participants in the proceeding, except as
authorized by law to the limited extent permitted."89 This does not
preclude a judge from consulting with other judges or subordinate
personnel whose function is to aid the judges in carrying out adjudi-
cative responsibilities.9"
Administrative Law Judge Ronnie Yoder boldly speaks out
against any "mandated" pre-issuance peer review, and charged that it
"is antiethical [sic] to the concept of judicial independence, and raises
serious questions concerning ex parte communications."91 He noted
that prior to the 1990 amendments to the ABA Model Code of Judi-
cial Conduct, there was controversy as to whether or not judges could
confer with other judges because the Code itself did not specifically
say they could.92 He acknowledged that the commentary had ap-
proved such discussions, but that the Code did not.9" As a result, the
Code was amended to specifically permit such discussions.94
In his exemplar entitled Administrative Law Treatise, Profes-
sor Kenneth Culp Davis discussed the issue of deciding officers' con-
sultation with staff:
May... [an Administrative Law Judge (AIJ)]
talk over the problem [in a specific case] with
a fellow AIJ? If he has doubts on any kind of
problem, may he consult with the chief A_?
88. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Cannon 3(B)(7)(c) (1990).
89. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGES Cannon 3(A)(4) (1999).
90. See id.
91. Yoder & Hardwicke, supra note 10, at 77.
92. Id. at 78.
93. Id.
94. Id.
If his problem is one of law, may he consult a
member of the agency's legal staff? May he
use an assistant to help him analyze a bulky
record? May he have a supervisor or an editor
look over his report and criticize it for both
substance and form? The operating answer to
all of these questions is, yes. "
Judge Jack B. Weinstein96 also addressed the issue of judges
consulting with one another regarding a pending case:
Some interjudicial consultations could
arguably create an appearance of partiality or
could deprive the parties of their right to full
participation in the case. For example, one
judge's comments about attorneys, witnesses,
or parties could prejudice them in another
judge's courtroom. Yet, in many instances, a
judge should be able to take advantage of the
wealth of legal knowledge, insight, and ex-
perience possessed by his colleagues. In the
easy give-and-take of my own district, we of-
ten visit each other's chambers to discuss rul-
ings that need to be made quickly.9 7
He continued:
I believe that consultation among judges on
the same court is as acceptable as consulta-
tion between a judge and clerk. This view ex-
tends, in my opinion, to consultation between
judges in different federal districts and be-
tween state and federal judges working on re-
lated cases .... Judges should be able to
consult with other judges in their own court-
house. It is often helpful to hear how other
judges within the same court are handling
similar cases. 98
95. 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 17:8, at 302
(2d ed. 1980).
96. Senior Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York.
97. Jack B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges' Learning, Speaking, and Act-
ing: Part II Speaking and Part III Acting, 20 U. DAYTON L. REv. 1, 14 (1994).
98. Id. at 15-16.
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The courts have not shied away from the controversy either.
In People v. Hernandez,99 a sentencing judge of one case had con-
sulted with the sentencing judge in the cited case regarding both the
circumstances of the cases and the meaning of a reviewing court's
opinion.' ° The California Court of Appeals ruled that this consulta-
tion was proper. °" Specifically, the court ruled that:
The record does not support, nor is it rea-
sonably susceptible of, any inference that the
trial court received any evidence from another
judge for any purpose. It is evident that the
determination of what is the law is not evi-
dence but, rather, a determination of the legal
principles to be applied to evidence. Thus a
discussion between judges as to the law appli-
cable in the case before one of them and even
the application of the law to the facts would
not fall within the prohibitions of Penal Code
section 1204.1"2
The opinion continued:
It should be noted that if procedural due proc-
ess prohibited conversations between judges
in the context we have discussed, then con-
versations between judges and law clerks
would also fall within the same prohibition.
More importantly, as has been observed with
any of the procedures discussed herein and
even with a total prohibition on communica-
tions by the judge with other judges or court
personnel, the enforcer of the prohibition and
the person who would determine its violation
is the judge himself. There is a presumption in
the honesty and integrity of our judicial offi-
cers. 10
3
99. 206 Cal. Rptr. 843 (Ct. App. 1984).
100. Id. at 847.
101. Id. at 852.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 855 (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
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The opinion concluded:
The judicial robe is a mantle of responsibility
that entrusts an individual with the most sa-
cred obligations that our society can impose
"the protection of each citizen's rights in a
neutral forum. The acceptance of the judicial
function does not confer greater wisdom upon
the individual but only greater responsibility.
In carrying out that responsibility, judges
must search their own minds and hearts in
making decisions but they cannot do this
without the benefit of the counsel they find in
their brethren" this is so for the lowest magis-
trate and the highest court. l 4
If you agree with Judges Wald, Weinstein, Hardwicke,
Schoenbaum, and Young, Professor Davis, and others, that, with cer-
tain enumerated exceptions, it is ethically and professionally appro-
priate to confer with colleagues regarding pending matters, then an-
other question is raised.
2. Does the Peer Review Actively Seek to Influence the
Outcome of the Pending Decision, or Does the Peer Review
Confine Itself to Clerical, Quality, and Compliance
Reviews?
The outcome, the "bottom line," of pending cases is the flash-
point of controversy between administrative adjudicators and the
agency. If the two sides can agree that, aside from the "bottom line,"
quality issues are also extremely important to the agency, the admin-
istrative adjudicator, and the system itself, then there should be no
opposition to a pure Quality Review. Accordingly, if errors in legal
analysis, accuracy, thoroughness, and logic, can be minimized by the
Quality Peer Review, there should be little opposition to those fea-
tures of the Peer Review Process. Nevertheless, despite those posi-
tive features, there remains an intractable minority, perhaps between
twenty and twenty-five percent of those polled in a largely unscien-
tific survey, of adjudicators who strongly oppose this form of peer
review. Once again, the issue is not quality or practicality, but rather
the highly charged "judicial independence." Of course, if the Quality
104. Hernandez, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
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Review slops over into the "bottom line," all bets are off, and the op-
position figures increase.
C. Pre-Issuance Review - The Agency Compliance Review
To some, the third step in the process, what I have styled as
the Agency Compliance Review, is merely a segue from the Quality
Review with "minor" distinctions. To others, the magnitude of those
distinctions is appreciable. The Agency Compliance Review presents
a new set of concerns for, in this instance, the peer reviewer is not
serving as the colleague or subordinate of the administrative adjudi-
cator, but rather as the agent of one of the parties to the controversy,
the agency. Even in the most benign of circumstances, the agency,
through the assigned peer reviewer, is encouraging its perceptions of
legal accuracy, thoroughness, and logic analysis. The agency, a party
to the action, is attempting to influence the selection of facts for fact-
finding, and the preference of law and written policy for legal analy-
sis.
In some more egregious situations, the agency may exhort the
adoption and employment of "informal" agency policy or unwritten
agency policy, agency "secret law," to mandate a particular outcome.
The other party has no input, and, in fact, may not even be cognizant
of the ex parte input from the agency. Thus, the Agency Compliance
Review engenders a significant degree of angst or opposition among
administrative adjudicators.
This form of review, likewise, should be performed by a true
"peer," a colleague, because it requires a magnitude of expertise and
experience which is greater than that ordinarily possessed by the
clerical reviewer, but, depending on the agency, may be performed
by a Subject Matter Expert, an individual with expertise in a variety
of areas, which may or may not include law or administrative adjudi-
cation.
1. Peer Review Should be "Outcome Indifferent."
1 0 5
In 1998, the Louisiana Legislature adopted the central panel
model of agency adjudication, but carried its structural changes be-
105. Justice W. Michael Gillette, Ore. Sup. Ct., Remarks to the National
Association of Administrative Law Judges (Oct. 15, 2000).
yond that which had been experienced elsewhere." 6 The most sur-
prising provision found in the Louisiana Statute that states, in part:
"[I]n an adjudication commenced by the [agency], the administrative
law judge shall issue the final decision or order .... and the agency
shall have no authority to override such decision or order."' ° On its
face, this provision may not be considered so unusual, but in this in-
stance, it is, because the agency possesses no power to mandate im-
proved quality or consistency, and it does not have the power to re-
view, reverse, or even appeal the decision of the administrative
adjudicator.
Maryland, on the other hand, which has also adopted the cen-
tral panel model of agency adjudication, offers an interesting study in
Agency Compliance Review. The Maryland Office of Administra-
tive Hearings is an independent agency within the Executive Branch
of state government reporting, not to any particular agency, but di-
rectly to the Governor. Chief Administrative Law Judge, John
Hardwicke, established a division within the office which deals with
Quality Assurance.
Quality Assurance in Maryland is maintained through what is
called a Subject Matter Specialist (SMS) Process. In that process,
prior to issuing a decision, the administrative adjudicator is required
to submit the draft decision to a designated SMS, an administrative
law judge with expertise in the subject area(s) being dealt with. The
SMS examines the draft decision using a checklist, and, if the draft
decision is in the correct format, has identified and discussed the ap-
plicable law, and the law was logically applied to the facts, the deci-
sion can be released, even if the SMS disagrees with the decision's
"bottom line," a significant factor in maintaining the necessary de-
gree of judicial decisional independence.
106. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:950-999.25 (West 1998).
107. Id. at § 49:992(B)(2).
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THE MARYLAND SMS DECISION CHECKLIST:
1. Format is incorrect
Statement of the Case
(i)insufficient procedural history
(ii)parties not identified
(iii)authority and/or procedure for the hearing not identified
(iv)date, place of hearing missing
(v)representatives at hearing not identified
Issue(s) incorrectly identified
Summary of Evidence incomplete
(i)complete list and identification of exhibits not provided
(ii)description of testimony incomplete
(l)each witness (name and title) not identified
(2)expert witness(es) with identification of expertise (name and title)
not specified
Findings of Fact inadequate
(i)lacks statement of standard of proof
(ii)recitation of testimony or evidence stated as fact
(iii)incomplete recitation of facts to support conclusions
(iv)facts not stated in logical order
(v)findings include conclusions of law or discussion elements
Fails to address and rule on motions
Discussion is inadequate
(i)fails to cite applicable law and quote when necessary
(ii)does not apply law to the facts
(iii)fails to contain complete analysis of relevant law
(iv)refers to facts which have not been included in the Findings of
Fact
(v)fails to articulate basis for determinations on credibility
(vi)fails to describe and resolve parties' arguments
Conclusions of Law are inadequate
(i)fails to reach conclusions for each issue raised
(ii) fails to contain a concise statement as to whether cited law
was or was not violated
(iii)contains discussion elements
Order is inadequate
(i) fails to set forth exactly what the parties are to do as a re-
sult of the decision made
(ii) does not follow from the conclusions of law
Appeal/Review Rights are incorrect or incomplete
(i)cites inappropriate rights (exceptions or appeal)
(ii)states the incorrect procedure
2. Fails to conform to File Protocol
3. Contains inappropriate language or gratuitous comments.' °
108. SMS Decision Checklist to All ALJs. Susan S. Fox, Director, Qual-
ity Assurance, Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings. Presentation
made at the 1996 Annual Meeting and Conference of the National Associa-
tion of Administrative Law Judges, Nashville, Tenn.
The Maryland Process is not, unfortunately, a universal standard for
an agency compliance review. Some agencies, in their respective
pre-issuance review process, concentrate to varying degrees on dif-
ferent aspects of the decision and the decision-making process. Some
agencies are seemingly concerned with decision format and structure,
some are attentive to issue consistency, others are interested in tech-
nical thoroughness, and still others are alert to specific mandatory is-
sues. Surely there can be no reluctance, on the part of the administra-
tive adjudicator, in complying with agency decision format and
structure requirements. Likewise, technical thoroughness and ade-
quate treatment of mandatory issues should not create an issue per-
taining to judicial independence. The obstacle arises when the ad-
ministrative adjudicator and the agency peer reviewer differ in their
views in three significant areas: (1) the materiality of certain facts
and policy; (2) the interpretation of agency policy; and, (3) retroac-
tive application of new agency policy. It is clear that the agency gen-
erally has the last word on policy, and the agency's expressed inter-
pretations regarding specific policies should be controlling. But, for
a minority of administrative adjudicators, "judicial independence,"
they believe, permits them to dismiss agency policy.
Separate 1992 surveys of administrative law judges and those
administrative adjudicators not classified as administrative law
judges, conducted by the Administrative Conference of the United
States (ACUS), revealed several interesting impressions.
Of the administrative law judges surveyed for all agencies,
when asked: "To what extent do you conceive of your job as involv-
ing... [a]pplying agency policies and regulations," seventy-one per-
cent of those surveyed responded, "great extent;" twenty-six percent
responded, "some extent;" and the remaining three percent re-
sponded, "not significant extent."1°9 Of other administrative adjudi-
cators surveyed for all agencies, when asked the same question, sev-
enty-eight percent of those surveyed responded, "frequent;"
seventeen percent responded, "occasionally;" and the remaining five
percent responded, "rarely/never." ' ° Of administrative law judges
surveyed for all agencies, when asked: "In reaching your decisions,
109. 1992 ACUS 1068, response 9.d.
110. Id. at 1108, response 15.d.
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how important do you consider ... [p]ublished agency regulations,"
ninety-five percent of those surveyed responded, "very;" four percent
responded, "somewhat;" and the remaining one percent responded,
"not."' Of other administrative adjudicators surveyed for all agen-
cies, when asked the same question, eighty-seven percent of those
surveyed responded, "very;" thirteen percent responded, "somewhat;"
and 0.4 percent responded, "not." 1 2
One striking response should also be noted. Of other admin-
istrative adjudicators surveyed for all agencies, when asked: "In
comparison to ALJs, do you think you have ... [d]uty to be bound
[by] agency policy," seventeen percent of those surveyed responded,
"greater;" fifty-four percent responded, "the same;" and twenty-eight
percent responded, "lesser." 13
Thus, it appears that administrative adjudicators differ in their
view of their professional responsibilities. The survey results leave
one to ponder what the minority of administrative adjudicators are
doing if their responsibilities do not involve applying agency policy;
or how the administrative adjudicators other than administrative law
judges view their responsibilities if they are less bound by agency
policy than administrative law judges.
"It is the judge's duty to decide all cases in accordance with
agency policy." '114
the agency always has the last word on policy....,1 15
One additional problem arises when policy is irregularly ap-
plied or when new or unpublished interpretations of published policy
appear. Professor Morell Mullens suggested stretching the envelope
when dealing with questionable agency policy. 16 He cautioned:
111. Id. at 1073, response 16.b.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1115, response 28.f.
114. MERITr RUHLEN, MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 79 (Admin-
istrative Conference of the United States, rev. ed. 1982).
115. Wald, supra note 83, at 666 (citing IT Cont'l Baking Co. v. FTC,
532 F.2d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 1976)).
116. MORELL MULLENS, MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States, 3d ed. 1993).
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Although the judge should follow agency pol-
icy and the law, the judge's decision may be
the last opportunity to call the attention of the
agency (or the courts if the agency denies re-
view) to an important problem of law or policy.
A judge who is wrong can easily be reversed,
but a judge who is correct may prevent sub-
stantial inequity and injustice. Such action
cannot be taken lightly but must reflect long
and careful research and analysis. The
judge's facts and reasoning, based on the re-
cord and the law, should be so clearly set
forth that the agency will know exactly what
has been done and why.117
The reverse side of the exhortation is that when there are chal-
lenges made to clearly established agency policy, or new unpublished
interpretations to published agency policy, the matter should nor-
mally be noted, but discussion and analysis of the disputed policy
avoided, in a manner similar to the handling of challenges based upon
constitutional grounds as matters not appropriate for discussion in the
particular forum by the administrative adjudicator. The difficulty lies
in the issue of what constitutes "policy" or "the agency rule," on the
one hand, and what is the "adjudication" on a factual record, on the
other.
The Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.,'18 furnished clear, but controversial,
guidance regarding agency policy and statutory construction and in-
terpretation:
When a court reviews an agency's construc-
tion of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always,
is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.... If, however,
the court determines Congress has not di-
117. Id. at 108.
118. 467 U.S. 837, 841-42 (1984).
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rectly addressed the precise question at issue,
the court does not simply impose its own con-
struction on the statute .... as would be nec-
essary in the absence of an administrative in-
terpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.'19
The Court continued:
We have long recognized that considerable
weight should be accorded to an executive de-
partment's construction of a statutory scheme
it is entrusted to administer.... and the prin-
ciple of deference to administrative interpreta-
tions has been consistently followed by this
Court whenever decision as to the meaning or
reach of a statute has involved reconciling
conflicting policies, and a full understanding
of the force of statutory policy in the given
situation has depended upon more than ordi-
nary knowledge respecting the matters sub-
jected to agency regulations. 120
"[I]f the legislative's intent is not plain to begin with, then the
agency gets to decide what that intent was."12'
Deference to agency policy, properly adopted or enacted
agency policy, is appropriate. Obedience to improperly or illegally
adopted agency policy, or newly revised contrary interpretations to
long-standing interpretations of properly adopted or enacted agency
policy, are inappropriate and should be avoided.
There is another potential conflict area regarding the agency
compliance review, and it occurs when the agency seeks to influence
consistency with earlier agency decisions. This becomes particularly
119. Id. at 842-43.
120. Id. at 844.
121. Justice W. Michael Gillette, Administrative Law Judges, Judicial
Independence, and Judicial Review: Qui Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?, 20
J.NAALJ 95, 102 (Spring 2000).
awkward when the decisions offered as "precedents" have, according
to agency rules, regulations, and policies, no "precedential" value
whatsoever, and merely predated the issuance of the decision under-
going scrutiny. Whether or not "non-precedential" decisions are re-
quired to be consistent is unclear. However, in general, agency con-
sistency is important, and any departure from prior policies and
standards accompanying a "reasoned analysis indicating that prior
policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually
ignored." 1
22
The most pivotal issue raised by the Agency Compliance Re-
view, and, in fact, the next question, is what happens if the peer re-
viewer determines that the decision fails to comply with minimum
standards, for example: incorrect format; poorly defined issues; inac-
curate or inadequate findings of fact; incorrect or incomplete policy;
inadequate discussion; incomplete or inadequate conclusions of law;
issues are not adequately disposed of; or the decision fails to adhere
to clear legal precedent, and the administrative adjudicator refuses to
make suggested modifications and corrections, either because he or
she disagrees on substantive grounds, or based on the issue of judicial
independence?
2. What Happens if the Peer Reviewer Determines That
the Decision Fails to Comply With Minimum Agency
Standards?
We come full circle with the question as to what happens if
the peer reviewer determines that the decision fails to comply with
minimum agency standards. Some administrative adjudicators will
happily accept constructive criticism to improve their work product.
Others, however, will resist any suggested changes. So long as the
"bottom line" is not addressed, reasonable minds may differ on some
subjective issues, such as discussions and conclusions, but there
should be little, if any, dispute pertaining to format, issues, facts, or
policy.
Continuing unresolved disputes may be resolved by including
another colleague in the discussions. If the dispute remains unre-
solved, the options are few: (1) the decision can be released as even-
122. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); see also, INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26 (1997).
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tually agreed, with the understanding that the administrative
adjudicator's accountability and responsibility may be revisited
should subsequent events prove the peer reviewer(s) assessments
correct; (2) the decision can be withheld by the agency for some
subsequent unspecified agency action; or (3) the decision can be
reversed by the agency head. In those agencies where the
administrative adjudicator issues final decisions, the eventual result
may be the withdrawal of the power to do so, with the
implementation of a process establishing recommended decisions.
Despite the positive features of the Agency Compliance Re-
view, the presence of the potential areas of dispute generates a sizable
majority, perhaps approaching seventy-five percent of those polled in
a largely unscientific survey, of adjudicators which strongly opposes
this form of peer review. The issue is not quality or practicality, but
rather the highly charged "judicial independence." Of course, if the
Agency Compliance Review approaches the "bottom line," the oppo-
sition figures increase as the form of review develops into the
Agency Acceptability Review.
D. Pre-Issuance Review - The Agency Acceptability Review
To many, the fourth step in the process, what I have styled as
the Agency Acceptability Review, is merely the bold usurpation of
decision-making by the agency, accompanied by the resultant loss of
any decisional independence by the administrative adjudicator. To
others, especially the agencies, it serves the legitimate purpose of en-
suring high decisional quality and consistency. As with the Agency
Compliance Review, in this instance, the peer reviewer is not serving
as the colleague or subordinate of the administrative adjudicator, but
rather as the agent of one of the parties to the controversy, the
agency.
Despite justifying agency actions under the Agency Accept-
ability Review, higher decisional quality and consistency, the agency,
through the assigned peer reviewer, is not merely encouraging its
perceptions of legal accuracy, thoroughness, and logic analysis, or at-
tempting to influence the selection of facts, for fact finding, and the
preference of law and written policy, for legal analysis. Instead, it is
mandating a particular outcome. This does not constitute ex parte in-
put from the agency, but rather direct decisional imposition. Thus,
the Agency Acceptability Review engenders a firestorm of angst or
opposition among administrative adjudicators.
This form of review can be performed by anyone because it
requires no expertise or experience, but rather a goal of decisional
consistency which is agency-friendly.
A brief study of the Social Security Administration's attempts
to impose such a process can be very instructive. A "targeting" proc-
ess called the "Bellmon Review Program," was instituted by the So-
cial Security Administration to implement a section of the Social Se-
curity Disability Amendments of 198023 referred to as the "Bellmon
Amendment." The "Bellmon Amendment" measures designed to
"improve decisional quality and accuracy," was a manifold approach
to a perceived problem which directed the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to review decisions of administrative law judges, on
her own motion, essentially because of concern over the high rate of
reversals, viewed as decisions unfavorable to the agency, and the
variances among administrative law judges. 24 The program com-
menced in October 1981.
According to the then-Associate Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration, the Bellmon Review was instituted, in part,
because of "Congressional concern about high allowance rates."'
' 25
He justified reviewing the decisions unfavorable to the agency, in
part, because "studies had shown that decisions in this group would
be the most likely to contain errors."'
' 21
As initially contemplated by the Bellmon Review process, in-
dividual administrative law judge's decisions would be reviewed on
the basis of the judge's prior decisions. 127 In other words, those ad-
ministrative law judges whose earlier decisions were unfavorable to
the agency at least seventy percent of the time were to be subjected to
100 percent review. 28 Those whose decisions were more favorable
to the agency would be reviewed on lower scales of seventy-five per-
123. Pub. L. No. 96-265 (1980) (discussed in 42 U.S.C. § 421 (1982)).
124. Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132,
1134 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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cent, fifty percent, and twenty-five percent, respectively.'29 Adminis-
trative law judges whose decisions were favorable, viewed as "accu-
rate," ninety-five percent of the time, would be removed from re-
view.' The legality of this "targeting" process was questioned by
the agency's own legal staff as having a "possible chilling effect on
the decisional independence of targeted ALJs," but the legal guidance
was rejected. 3' The agency's intentions and expectations were un-
mistakable: AALJ allowance rates were "untenable," '132 and targeting
would lead to "some reduction in allowance rates."'33
The program had its desired "chilling" effect: the decline in
allowance rates was viewed as "good news" to the agency.' 34
A separate segment of the Bellmon Review described, but
never implemented, provided for individualized "feedback and coun-
seling" which some administrative law judges feared would serve to
"direct high allowance ALJs how to develop, hear and decide
cases." 1
35
The next step of the Bellmon Review was "if, after further re-
view an AL' s performance had not improved, other steps would be
considered."'3 6 This provision was sensed as a warning that unre-
formed or unsuccessfully re-indoctrinated administrative law judges
would be targeted for adverse personnel action, which could include
dismissal. "'
Although described by the agency as a process separate from
the Bellmon Review, some administrative law judges at a particularly
troublesome office, one which had high allowance rates, viewed by
the agency as having "significant deficiencies in the quality and accu-
racy" of decisions, were given training by senior agency personnel.'38
The expressed purpose for the training was to "correct decisions and
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1136.
132. Id. at 1137.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1135.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1137.
not to pressure [the administrative law judges] to reduce allowance
rates."' 39 The court disagreed:
The worthiness of defendants' stated goal of
improving the quality and accuracy of deci-
sions notwithstanding, targeting high allow-
ance ALJs for review, counseling and possible
disciplinary action was of dubious legality....
[The evidence as a whole, persuasively dem-
onstrated that defendants retained an unjusti-
fiable preoccupation with allowance rates, to
the extent that ALJs could reasonably feel
pressure to issue fewer allowance decisions in
the name of accuracy. While there was no
evidence that an ALJ consciously succumbed
to such pressure, in close cases, and, in par-
ticular, where the determination of disability
may have been based largely on subjective fac-
tors, as a matter of common sense, that pres-
sure may have intruded upon the fact-finding
process and may have influenced some out-
comes. 140
The court concluded:
[Dlefendants' unremitting focus on allowance
rates in the individual A/J portion of the
Bellmon Review Program created an untenable
atmosphere of tension and unfairness which
violated the spirit of the APA, if no specific
provision thereof. Defendants' insensitivity to
that degree of decisional independence the
APA affords to administrative law judges and
the injudicious use of phrases such as "target-
ing," "goals" and "behavior modification" could
have tended to corrupt the ability of adminis-
trative law judges to exercise that independ-
ence in the vital cases that they decide. 141
Both sides won segments of their dispute. The Bellmon Re-
view Program was altered to such a degree that most of the objec-
tionable features thereof were abolished, and those changes enabled
139. Id. at 1138.
140. Id. at 1141-42.
141. Id. at 1143.
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the court to obviate the need for injunctive relief, permitting the
agency to prevail, at that time. For the next few years all was quiet,
until September 1997, when a newly revised form of the Bellmon
Review Program was proposed and public comment solicited. 142 But,
that is the subject of another presentation.
It is unfortunate that agencies and others choose to deprecate
administrative adjudicators for perceived past decisional transgres-
sions, the issuance of decisions deemed to be contrary to the agency's
desires and interests, in an obvious effort to influence the "bottom
line" of pending cases. There is a potential irrevocable "chilling" ef-
fect unleashed when a decision is unfairly disparaged, but the criti-
cism extends beyond an assault upon the decision and ends up as an
attack upon the judge and the system. In response to one such con-
tinuing media and political barrage, the chief judge and three of his
predecessors of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit1 43 wrote
a public release:
We have no quarrel with criticism of any deci-
sion rendered by any judge. Informed com-
ment and disagreement from lawyers, academ-
ics, and public officials have been hallmarks of
the American legal tradition.
But there is an important line between legiti-
mate criticism of a decision and illegitimate at-
tack upon a judge. Criticism of a decision can
illuminate issues and sometimes point the
way toward better decisions. Attacks on a
judge risk inhibition of all judges as they con-
scientiously endeavor to discharge their con-
stitutional responsibilities.'44
Despite agency professed concern for ensuring high deci-
sional quality and consistency, Agency Acceptability Review has no
place in a system which purports to offer due process and fundamen-
tal fairness. The overwhelming majority of those polled in a largely
142. 62 Fed. Reg. 50,266 (1997) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404,
416).
143. JJ. Jon 0. Newman, J. Edward Lumbard, Wilfred Feinberg, and
James L. Oakes.
144. Statement issued by Second Circuit Chief Judge and three prede-
cessors (Mar. 28, 1996), in JOHN 0. NEWMAN, THE JUDGE BAER CONTROVERSY,
80 JUDICATURE 156, 158 (1997).
unscientific survey, perhaps as many as ninety-five percent, strongly
oppose this form of peer review. The issue is not quality or practical-
ity, but rather the highly charged "judicial independence." The
agency's power to usurp the decision-making process, accompanied
by the resultant loss of any decisional independence by the adminis-
trative adjudicator, perhaps substituting "recommended decisions"
for final ones, serves only to maintain the faqade of due process and
undermines the entire system. If the agency wishes to retain the
power to issue its own decisions, in most cases, it has the power to do
so. However, if the agency wishes to project the appearance of for-
mality and due process, it should permit the peer review process to
end with the Agency Compliance Review.
IV. CONCLUSION
It should be the combined goal of all involved in the adminis-
trative adjudication process that errors in grammar, syntax, punctua-
tion, spelling, legal analysis, accuracy, thoroughness, logic, format,
issues, facts, and policy, be minimized to the degree that they become
invisible to the discussion as to the wisdom of the overall "bottom
line." As argued by agencies, quality and consistency may be en-
hanced when these variables are routinely accomplished. However,
while consistency may be an overriding objective, generally, it must
be remembered that each decision must stand on its own merits and
facts, and that attempts by anyone to mandate universal obedience to
a vague notion of consistency, meaning many things to many people,
will necessarily fail. Is due process being conducted when the deci-
sions are either all favorable or all unfavorable to the agency? The
answer is not the visceral reaction, "no," but rather, "maybe," de-
pending on an analysis of the circumstances of the individual case(s).
Administrative adjudicators and their respective agencies are
at odds over how to handle authority, accountability, responsibility,
quality, and consistency through the peer review process. When the
intractable positions of both sides come to a mutual understanding as
to the genuine purposes of the adjudicative process and the value of
the peer review process, the system will benefit. In truth, the system
was established to furnish individuals a means of redress regarding
governmental actions. The agencies acquiesce with the process and
aggressively solicit agency-favorable decisions and accommodating
administrative adjudicators. When the decisions become less than
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desirable, the agency may criticize and demean the administrative ad-
judicator by characterizing the decisions as being of poor quality and
inconsistent, and the adjudicator as a substandard performer. On the
other side, the administrative adjudicator shrouds himself or herself
in the robe and persona of the "real judge," and generally assumes the
responsibilities of the position. Due process is the acknowledged
function, and fundamental fairness is the declared objective. To the
dedicated and responsible administrative adjudicator, the agency is
merely one of the parties to the dispute, and thus, accrues no particu-
lar advantage in the process. In reality, this impression is legitimate
and commendable.
